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THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice 
in Support of Burger King Corporation’s Motions to (1) Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); and (2) Deny Class Certification Pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) and (d)(1)(D) (“Request for Judicial Notice”) (DE [20]) and the 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and Deny Class Certification 
(“Motion to Dismiss”) (DE [25]).  This Court heard oral argument from counsel on June 
30, 2020.  Having considered the motion, the record, and being otherwise fully advised in 
the premises, this Order follows. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In the First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) (DE [24]), Plaintiffs Phillip Williams, 
William Jones, Michael Roberts, Ali Bey, Christopher McGee, Tiffany Cuthrell, and Marie 
Venter (collectively “Plaintiffs”) assert Defendant Burger King Corporation (“BKC”) 
“duped” them.  Specifically, Plaintiffs allege they were misled into believing the 
“Impossible” plant-based patty in Burger King’s “Impossible Whopper” sandwich, supplied 
by Impossible Foods, Inc., would be flame broiled on a different grill than the one used to 
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cook beef and chicken.  Plaintiffs have since dropped the claim that BKC marketed the 
“Impossible Burger” as vegan. 
Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint (DE [24]) BKC operates myriad fast food 
restaurants across the country and is best known for its “Whopper” burgers made with 
beef.  (Compl. (DE [24]), ¶ 24).  In April 2019, knowing that there is a growing consumer 
demand for vegan, vegetarian, and meat-free food options, BKC decided to tap in by 
creating its “Impossible Whopper,” with a burger patty made from “Impossible” meats.  Id. 
at ¶¶ 5, 25.  Plaintiffs bring suit against BKC alleging (1) breach of contract (Count I); (2) 
violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”) (Count II); (3) 
violation of New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices (Count III); (4) violation of New York’s 
False Advertising Act (Count IV); (5) violation of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”) 
(Count V); (6) violation of the “Unlawful Prong” of the California Unfair Competition Law 
(“UCL”) (Count VI); (7) violation of the “Fraudulent Prong” of the California Unfair 
Competition Law (“UCL”) (Count VII); (8) violation of Michigan’s Consumer Protection Act 
(“MCPA”) (Count VIII); (9) violation of Georgia’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices 
Act (Count IX); and (10) unjust enrichment (Count X). 
In the instant motion, BKC argues Plaintiffs do not dispute the “Impossible Burger” 
is 100% plant-based and Plaintiffs claims cannot meet the “reasonableness” requirement.  
BKC insists its advertising campaign never promised the “Impossible Burger” would be 
cooked on a separate surface, and Plaintiffs could not have had an objectively reasonable 
belief that it would unless specifically requested by a patron when placing an order.  
Plaintiffs admit they did not ask about the cooking method nor did they request an 
alternate method of preparation to satisfy their unique dietary requirements. 
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BKC also takes exception to the creation of a class, arguing that Plaintiffs cannot 
represent a class of all “Impossible Burger” purchasers because each Plaintiff has 
different personal preferences, and Plaintiffs fail to plausibly assert that all “Impossible 
Burger” purchasers share their stance.  Plaintiffs disagree and claim BKC’s misleading 
advertising created purchasers where none would have otherwise existed.  Plaintiffs also 
argue it is too early to consider class certification. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A. Motion to Dismiss 
At the pleading stage, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).  Although Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a) does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does 
require “more than labels and conclusions . . . a formulaic recitation of the cause of action 
will not do.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  To survive a motion 
to dismiss, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level” and must be sufficient “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Id. at 555.  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court’s review is generally 
“limited to the four corners of the complaint.”  Wilchombev v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 
F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 
(11th Cir. 2002)).  Courts must review the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and it must generally accept the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true.  Hishon v. 
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 
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1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007).  However, pleadings that “are no more than conclusions are 
not entitled to the assumption of truth.  While legal conclusions can provide the framework 
of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
B. Class Certification 
“A class action may be maintained only when it satisfies all the requirements of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and at least one of the alternative requirements of Rule 23(b).”  
Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir. 1997) (footnotes 
omitted).  Rule 23(a) sets forth the four prerequisites to maintain any claim as a class 
action, commonly referred to as: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) 
adequacy of representation.  Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 
2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).  If the proposed class satisfies the four factors of 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, as well as the implicit requirement of 
ascertainability, it must then demonstrate entitlement to class relief under one of the three 
provisions in Rule 23(b).  See Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th 
Cir. 2000).  Certifying a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) requires additional findings that 
“the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  
The burden of satisfying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is on the party seeking class 
certification.  Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 456 (11th Cir. 1996). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Count I – Breach of Contract 
“For a breach of contract claim, Florida law requires the plaintiff to plead and 
establish: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) a material breach of that contract; and (3) 
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damages resulting from the breach.”  Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 
(11th Cir. 2009); see e.g., Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 985 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2008). “To prove the existence of a contract, a plaintiff must plead: (1) offer; (2) 
acceptance; (3) consideration; and (4) sufficient specification of the essential terms.”  Id. 
(citing St. Joe Corp. v. McIver, 875 So. 2d 375, 381 (Fla. 2004) (citing W.R. Townsend 
Contracting, Inc. v. Jensen Civil Constr., Inc., 728 So. 2d 297, 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999))). 
Here, the parties agree there is a valid contract.  The dispute is based on whether 
such contract is express or implied.  “An express contract differs from an implied contract 
in that “[a]n express contract is one where the intention of the parties and the terms of the 
agreement are declared or expressed by the parties, in writing or orally, at the time it is 
entered into, while an implied contract is one not created or evidenced by distinct and 
explicit language.”  Davidson v. Maraj, 609 Fed. Appx. 994, 998 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations 
omitted).  In this case, Burger King made an offer (the ad for the “Impossible Burger”), 
which Plaintiffs accepted (by ordering the “Impossible Burger”), consideration was 
exchanged (Plaintiffs’ money for the “Impossible Burger”), and the essential terms were 
clear.  Thus, this Court must conclude the parties had an express contract. 
Plaintiffs’ argument, however, loses momentum when they claim there was a 
presumption the “Impossible” patties would be cooked on a different grill than other items 
sold at Burger King.  This is not an essential term of the contract.  Furthermore, as Burger 
King’s slogan has boasted for forty years, Plaintiffs’ could have “Had it [their] way” by 
requesting a different cooking method, thereby altering the terms of the contract. 
B. Count II – FDUTPA 
FDUTPA prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or 
practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
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commerce.”  § 501.204(1), Fla. Stat.  A complaint states a FDUTPA cause of action if it 
alleges (1) an unfair practice or deceptive act; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.  
See Guerrero v. Target Corp., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2012).  Stated 
otherwise, the law allows for a plaintiff to recover under FDUTPA if he proves he was 
injured “by an objectively deceptive act or statement.”  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Performance Orthopaedics & Neurosurgery, LLC, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 
2017).  Here, Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim is premised on the fact that the “Impossible 
Whopper” was cooked on the same grill as meat-containing products.  The Complaint 
(DE [24]) fails to provide any more specific details regarding the preparation of the 
“Impossible Whopper.” 
The remainder of Plaintiffs’ consumer fraud claims will be set forth below but 
analyzed collectively following section I.  Each claim rests upon the “reasonable 
consumer” test also outlined below. 
C. Count III – New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices 
New York General Business Law, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 349 makes unlawful 
“[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business” and creates a private right 
of action under which a litigant may recover actual damages.  NY CLS Gen Bus § 349; 
see generally Belair Care Ctr., Inc. v. Cool Insuring Agency, Inc., 168 AD3d 1162, 1165–
1166, (2019); Benetech, Inc. v. Omni Fin. Group, Inc., 116 AD3d 1190, 1190–119 (2014). 
As a threshold matter, “[a] claim brought under this statute must be predicated on an act 
or practice which is consumer-oriented, that is, an act having the potential to affect the 
public at large.”  Elacqua v. Physicians’ Reciprocal Insurers, 52 AD3d 886, 888, 860 
(2008) (citation omitted).  “A cause of action to recover damages pursuant to General 
Business Law § 349 has three elements: first, that the challenged act or practice was 
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consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way; and third, that the 
plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”  Beneficial Homeowner Serv. 
Corp. v. Williams, 113 AD3d 713, 714 (2014). 
D. Count IV – New York’s False Advertising Act 
New York General Business Law, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 350, states “[f]alse 
advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any 
service in this state is hereby declared unlawful.”  NY CLS Gen Bus § 350.  To establish 
a claim under either section of this law, a plaintiff must show “(i) that the act or practice 
was misleading in a material respect, and (ii) that the plaintiff was injured.”  Coors Brewing 
Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 802 F. Supp. 965, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also McDonald 
v. North Shore Yacht Sales, Inc., 513 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
E. Count V – California’s False Advertising Law 
California’s False Advertising Law (FAL), Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq., has 
been accurately described as the major California legislation designed to protect 
consumers from false or deceptive advertising.  See Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. 
Superior Ct., 9 Cal. 5th 279, 305 (2020) (citation omitted).  The procedures set forth in 
the FAL and in California’s unfair competition law (UCL), Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et 
seq., are in many respects parallel to one another, and the UCL specifically provides that 
any practice that violates the FAL is also prohibited by the UCL.  See Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17200.  California’s FAL prohibits “not only advertising which is false, but also 
advertising which[,] although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, 
likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.”  Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 
939, 951 (2002).  Thus, to state a claim under either the UCL or the false advertising law, 
based on false advertising or promotional practices, “it is necessary only to show that 
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“members of the public are likely to be deceived.”  Id. (quoting Leoni v. State Bar, 39 
Cal.3d 609, 626 (1985). 
F. Count VI – Violation of the “Unlawful Prong” of the California Unfair 
Competition Law 
The UCL sets out three different kinds of business acts or practices that may 
constitute unfair competition: the unlawful, the unfair, and the fraudulent.  See Cal. Bus. 
Prof. Code § 17500 et seq.  A private person has standing to bring an action under the 
California Unfair Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq., only if he or she 
has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property because of the unfair 
competition.  Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1360–61 (2010).  A 
private plaintiff must make a twofold showing: he or she must demonstrate injury in fact, 
and a loss of money or property caused by unfair competition.  Id.  “An unlawful business 
practice under [Business and Professions Code] section 17200 is an act or practice, 
committed pursuant to business activity, that is at the same time forbidden by law.”  Id.  
(citations omitted). 
G. Count VII – Violation of the “Fraudulent Prong” of the California Unfair 
Competition Law 
A UCL claim based on the fraudulent prong can be made not only on 
representations that deceive because they are untrue, but also those which despite some 
level of accuracy still tend to mislead or deceive.  “A perfectly true statement couched in 
such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to 
disclose other relevant information, is actionable under the UCL.”  Morgan v. AT&T 
Wireless Servs., Inc., 177 Cal. App. 4th 1235, 1255 (2009) (citations omitted). 
H. Count VIII – Michigan’s Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) 
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The Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) prohibits unfair, unconscionable, 
or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.  See Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.903.  “The MCPA is much broader than the common law tort of 
fraud, covering not only deceptive practices but also unfair and unconscionable conduct.”  
Date v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 2010 WL 3702599 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 16, 2010).  It applies only 
to purchases by consumers and does not apply to purchases that are primarily for 
business purposes.  See Nedschroef Detroit Corp. v. Bemas Enters. LLC, 106 F. Supp. 
3d 874, 887 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (citations omitted).  The MCPA prohibits making an 
omission of fact that tends to mislead or deceive any consumer, but only if the omitted 
fact could not reasonably be known by that consumer.  Zine v. Chrysler Corp., 236 Mich. 
App. 261, 283–84 (1999). 
I. Count IX – Georgia’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act 
The stated intent of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 
et seq., is to protect the public from acts and practices which are injurious to consumers, 
not to provide an additional remedy for private wrongs which do not and could not affect 
the consuming public generally.  Henderson v. Gandy, 270 Ga. App. 827, 829 (2004) 
(citations omitted).  The scope of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 
10-1-390 et seq., is limited to acts in the conduct of consumer transactions and consumer 
acts or practices in trade or commerce.  Id. at 829–30.  O.C.G.A. § 10-1-392 (a) (3), 
defines “consumer acts or practices” as “acts or practices intended to encourage 
consumer transactions,” and defines “trade” and “commerce” as “the advertising, 
distribution, sale, lease, or offering for distribution, sale, or lease of any goods, services, 
or any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, 
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commodity, or thing of value wherever situated and shall include any trade or commerce 
directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state.”  OCGA § 10-1-392 (a) (2.1). 
PLAINTIFFS’ CONSUMER FRAUD CLAIMS 
Plaintiffs’ counts II through IX are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test.  
Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).  
“Under the reasonable consumer standard, [Plaintiffs] must show that members of the 
public are likely to be deceived.”  Id. (citations omitted); see also Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 
F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016).  “The Florida Supreme Court has noted that ‘deception 
occurs if there is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the 
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.’”  Zlotnick 
v. Premier Sales Grp., Inc., 480 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).  “This 
standard requires a showing of ‘probable, not possible, deception” that is “likely to cause 
injury to a reasonable relying consumer.’”  Id. (citation omitted); see also Ebner, 838 F.3d 
at 965 (requiring more than a mere possibility that Burger King’s advertisement “might 
conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable 
manner.”). 
Plaintiffs argue Burger King’s advertisement promised more than a non-meat patty.  
Further, Plaintiffs argue it is too early to make such a determination at this stage of the 
proceedings.  This Court cannot agree.  Burger King promised a non-meat patty and 
delivered with the “Impossible Burger.” 
J. Count X – Unjust Enrichment 
“A claim for unjust enrichment is an equitable claim, based on a legal fiction created 
by courts to imply a “contract” as a matter of law.”  Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili, SRL, 
198 F.3d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 1999).  “Liability in unjust enrichment has in principle nothing 
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to do with fault. It has to do with wealth being in one person’s hands when it should be in 
another person’s.”  Guyana Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Melbourne Int’l Comms., Ltd., 329 F.3d 
1241, 1245 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003).  The doctrine applies only where (1) the plaintiff conferred 
a benefit on the defendant, who had knowledge of the benefit; (2) the defendant 
voluntarily accepted and retained the benefit; and (3) under the circumstances, it would 
be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it.  See Shands 
Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 899 So. 2d 1222, 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2005). 
This Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment with prejudice 
because the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties typically 
precludes an unjust enrichment claim arising out of a contract.  See White Holding Co., 
Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 423 Fed. Appx. 943, 946 (11th Cir. 2011).  
Furthermore, Burger King gave adequate consideration to Plaintiffs for the benefit 
conferred (i.e., the “Impossible Whopper” in exchange for the price). 
K. Defendant’s Motion to Deny Class Certification 
“At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class 
representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class 
action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).  However, dismissal of class allegations at the 
pleading stage “is an extreme remedy appropriate only where a defendant demonstrates 
from the face of the complaint that it will be impossible to certify the classes alleged by 
the plaintiff regardless of the facts the plaintiff may be able to prove.”  Lawson v. Life of 
the S. Ins., Co., 286 F.R.D. 689, 695 (M.D. Ga. 2012) (citations omitted).  “Failure to prove 
any of the four Rule 23(a) requirements and at least one of the alternative requirements 
of Rule 23(b) precludes class certification.” Id. at 696 (citations omitted). 
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As an initial matter, “[c]onsidering whether questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominately begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying 
cause of action.”  Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions 
Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014).  Plaintiffs argue it is too soon for this 
Court to consider whether they satisfy Rule 23.  Defendant disagrees and argues Plaintiffs 
claims are too individualized to support class certification.  This Court agrees.  
Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice in 
Support of Burger King Corporation’s Motions to (1) Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); and (2) Deny Class Certification Pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) and (d)(1)(D) (DE [20]) is GRANTED.  The Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and Deny Class Certification (DE [25]) is 
GRANTED.  Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and consumer fraud (Counts I through 
IX) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment 
(Count X) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.  Further, as stated on the record, the 
Plaintiff’s request for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE.  Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to amend its complaint by July 27, 
2020. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 20th day of 
July 2020. 
 
Copies furnished to counsel of record via CM/ECF 
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